Human altruism is often expressed through charitable donation-supporting a cause that benefits others in society, at cost to oneself. The underlying mechanisms of this other-regarding behavior remain imperfectly understood. By recording event-related-potential (ERP) measures of brain activity from human participants during a social gambling task, we identified markers of differential responses to receipt of monetary outcomes for oneself vs for a charitable cause. We focused our ERP analyses on the frontocentral feedback-related negativity (FRN) and three subcomponents of the attention-related P300 (P3) brain wave: the frontocentral P2 and P3a and the parietal P3b. The FRN distinguished between gains and losses for both self and charity outcomes. Importantly, this effect of outcome valence was greater for self than charity for both groups and was independent of two altruism-related measures: participants' pre-declared intended donations and the actual donations resulting from their choices. In contrast, differences in P3 subcomponents for outcomes for self vs charity strongly predicted both of our laboratory measures of altruism-as well as self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors. These results indicate that individual differences in altruism are linked to individual differences in the relative deployment of attention (as indexed by the P3) toward outcomes affecting other people.
Introduction
Altruistic acts increase the welfare of others at a personal cost (Batson and Shaw, 1991) . In most animal species, altruistic acts are exclusively directed toward kin (Hamilton, 1964) . In humans, however, altruism goes far beyond helping genetically related individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005) and is not limited to interpersonal interactions. Indeed, humans often sacrifice personal welfare on behalf of societal causes. Charitable donations of one's personal financial assets are a clear manifestation of this unique feature of human altruism, and an increasing number of studies have started focusing on decisions involving charities in order to shed light on other-regarding behavior (for a review, see Mayr et al., 2008) .
Recently, Kwak et al. (2014) conducted a behavioral study using a social gambling task (SGT) in which participants could learn to increase payoffs for themselves and/or for a charity institution. The authors reported an association between altruistic traits and the learning bias toward charitable outcomes (vs self-outcomes). Here, we use event-related-potential (ERP) measures of electrical brain activity and a modified version of the SGT to evaluate the neurocognitive processes that could underlie this link between pro-social behavior and reward learning. The first hypothesis that we considered was that this link may be associated with differences in the way that the brain extracts utility from outcomes for oneself vs for others. Indeed, a characteristic feature of charitable giving is that it activates ventral striatal regions (Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007) that typically respond to primary rewards (Apicella et al., 1997; Delgado, 2007; Delgado et al., 2014) and are considered to be a central component in the circuit for utility computations in the brain (Knutson and Peterson, 2005; Rangel et al., 2008) . However, recent work has also linked pros-social tendencies to the structure and function of the temporoparietal junction (Tankersley et al., 2007; Morishima et al., 2012; Carter and Huettel, 2013) , a brain region typically associated with higherlevel cognitive processes, including directing attention to relevant outcomes. This suggests, as a second hypothesis, that attentional processes unrelated to utility calculations could be involved in the link between altruistic traits and biases in reward learning reported by Kwak et al. (2014) .
In this study, we took advantage of the high temporal resolution of the ERP technique in order to distinguish processes associated with utility extraction from processes associated with attentional allocation. Indeed, previous studies in humans suggest that these two sorts of process are indexed by two different ERP components: the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P300 (P3), respectively (San Mart ın, 2012) . The FRN is a frontocentral negative-going ERP component that peaks $250 ms following the presentation of outcome information in decision-making tasks; its amplitude in response to outcomes tends to be proportional to the difference between acquired and expected utility (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; San Mart ın et al., 2010) . Source modeling studies have indicated that the FRN is likely generated, at least in part, in the anterior cingulate cortex in the frontal cortex (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; van Schie et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2009) . In contrast, the neural sources of the P3 are less clear and specific, with sources probably distributed across different regions of the cortex. In the context of learning-guided decision-making tasks, the P3 is thought to reflect attentional allocation during feedback evaluation (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; San Mart ın, 2012; San Mart ın et al., 2013) . The P3 is composed of at least two distinguishable subcomponents: the early (peak $350 ms), frontally distributed P3a, which is thought to reflect stimulus-driven attentional processes, and the late (peak $450 ms), parietally distributed P3b, which is thought to reflect the amount of attention that is devoted to stimulus-induced memory or context updating (Polich, 2007) . In reward learning studies, it is also important to characterize activity that precedes the onset of the FRN and has been labeled as 'P2' or 'P200' (peak $180 ms); this activity has been shown to be specifically associated with higher arousal levels (Carretié et al., 2001; Schutter et al., 2004) and attention capturing by target stimuli (Potts et al., 1996 (Potts et al., , 2006 Potts, 2004) .
Previous ERP studies employing monetary gambling tasks have demonstrated that the FRN and P3 are elicited not only in response to one's own gains and losses but also in response to outcomes for others. For example, Itagaki and Katayama (2008) found that when others' gains led to losses for the observer, the FRN to others' gambling outcomes presented a reversedpolarity potential, being more negative in response to others' gains than in response to others' losses. Fukushima and Hiraki (2009) found that the FRN was elicited when observing the outcomes of decisions made by human agents, but not elicited in response to outcomes of decisions made by a computer. Furthermore, they found that self-reported measures of empathy toward the human agent were positively associated with the magnitude of this FRN. These studies suggest both that the FRN indexes a utility-based computation and that those computations can be applied to outcomes for others. The P3, in contrast, has been linked to a more general process of attentional allocation according to motivational/affective salience; like the FRN, though, this component is not specific to reward and social information (Leng and Zhou, 2010; Ma et al., 2011) Here, we evaluated whether social and non-social reward learning modulate these rapid ERP components-as predicted based on prior work-and tested two corollary predictions about the relationship between brain responses and pro-social behavior. First, we tested whether the propensity for pro-social learning (i.e. learning that increases benefits for a charitable organization) would covary with individual differences in the neural responses to pro-social outcomes (i.e. comparing charity vs self). Second, we evaluated whether such neural responses for charity vs self could predict self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors across individuals. If altruistic tendencies come into play during the rapid evaluation of utility, we would expect to see an association between individual differences in altruism and the FRN. In contrast, if altruistic tendencies alter higher-level attention-sensitive cognitive updating processes, we would expect to see an association between individual differences in altruism and the longer-latency P3.
Materials and methods

Participants
Forty-two healthy, right-handed, adult volunteers (22 male) participated in this study [ages, 18-34 years; mean (M) ¼ 22.0]. Participants were recruited through the Duke Center for Cognitive Neuroscience Research Participation website (https:// ccn-participate.sona-systems.com/). They signed up after reading the following description of the experiment: 'If you choose to participate, you will wear a cap with electrodes that records your brain activity while playing a game in which you can win money for yourself and for a charity institution. The experimental session will take $2 h. You will be financially compensated at $15 per hour, with an extra bonus depending on the points earned during the experimental session'.
On ¼ $5.37 ) to the charity institution selected by the participant (see below), according to the points that the participant collected for the charity during the experimental session. Participants gave written informed consent and all procedures were approved by the Duke University Health System Institutional Review Board. We excluded four participants from ERP data analysis due to technical difficulties during their experimental sessions, leaving a final sample of 38 participants (20 male). receiving instructions about the task, and before responding to any other questionnaire.
Second, participants read instructions describing the study paradigm and four local charity institutions: Central NC Chapter of the American Red Cross, Animal Protection Society of Durham, Durham Literacy Center, Easter Seals of North Carolina. They were asked to choose one charity that would benefit from their participation in the experiment.
Third, we asked each participant to declare an intended donation using a paper questionnaire with the following question: 'Suppose that you win $50.00 in total during the task. How much of that money would you like to keep and how much would you like to donate to the institution that you just chose?' Before answering this question, subjects were informed that their donation to the charity would be based on their performance in the task and not based on their answer to this question. Responses to this question were later used to calculate an intended-donation score for each participant (see below, 'Questionnaires and behavioral data analysis' section).
Stimuli and task
We employed a probabilistic decision-making task based on the SGT designed by Kwak et al. (2014) . Participants sat in front of a computer screen and performed 800 trials over the course of a single experimental session divided into 10 six-minute blocks. They were told that each trial would start with the presentation of four 'decks', each labeled with a different symbol. They were informed that the four decks were probabilistically associated with different payoffs for self and charity; by learning those probabilistic relationships, they could maximize the earnings for self and/or for charity, based on their own preferences. Also, they were told that the probabilistic relationship between decks and gains/losses would remain constant during each 80-trial block, and that new decks labeled with new symbols would appear at the beginning of each block. Subjects were also informed that no information regarding the conversion from points to money would be provided until the end of the experiment. Before data collection, participants completed a 20-trial practice session using a set of decks different from the ones used during data collection.
The temporal sequence of the task as it unfolded over a single example trial is shown in Figure 1A . Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross and four decks, each one labeled with a different unfamiliar symbol (i.e. a Japanese Hiragana character). The positions of the decks were randomized across trials, and they remained on the screen until the participant made a selection. Notice that, even though the position of the decks changed from trial to trial, participants could keep track of the identity of each deck based on the specific symbol that served as its label. If no response was made within 1200 ms, the words 'no response' were presented on the screen and a new trial started. The participant chose one of the decks by pressing one out of four joystick buttons that were spatially matched with the options on the screen. The selection was highlighted by superimposing a semitransparent yellow square on the chosen symbol for a period jittered in duration length between 100 and 200 ms. After an interstimulus interval (ISI) jittered between 600 and 800 ms, the outcomes for self and for charity were presented sequentially. The specific sequence of these outcomes (self-first/charity-second vs charity-first/selfsecond) was randomized across trials. Stars and circles indicated whether the outcome was for self or for charity, and the specific symbol-recipient association (stars-self/circles-charity vs stars-charity/circles-self) was randomized across participants. Won points were presented as green symbols and lost points were presented as red symbols. For example, Figure 1A presents the case of losing three points for self and winning two points for charity (for a participant for whom stars presented outcomes for self and circles presented outcomes). The presentation of outcomes for self and charity were temporally separated by an ISI jittered between 600 and 800 ms, and the next trial started after an intertrial interval jittered between 800 and 1200 ms. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on the central cross throughout the experimental runs.
The outcome for self and charity on each trial was probabilistically set according to the following formula. With regard to the valence (win vs loss) of the outcomes for self and charity, each deck was associated with a specific probability for each of four possible scenarios: Self-win\Charity-win, Self-win\Charity-loss, Self-loss\Charity-win and Self-loss\Charity-loss ( Figure 1B ). According to those probabilities, one of the decks tended to deliver gains both to self and charity (Sþ\Cþ), a second one tended to deliver even more frequent gains to self but losses to charity (S þþ\CÀ), a third deck tended to deliver losses to self but highly frequent gains to charity (SÀ\C þþ) and finally a fourth deck tended to deliver losses both to self and charity (SÀ\CÀ). With regard to the magnitude of the gains or losses for self and charity, the stimulation software randomly selected one out of four possible outcome magnitudes (1, 2, 3 or 4 points; 25% chances each), independently for self and charity. Importantly, participants' choices affected the probability of winning vs losing but not the number of points that were won or lost.
As a result, deck Sþ\Cþ was associated with an expected value (EV) of 0.5 points for self and 0.5 points for charity, deck S þþ\CÀ with an EV of 1.25 points for self and À0.25 points for charity, deck SÀ\C þþ with an EV of À0.25 points for self and 1.25 points for charity and deck SÀ\CÀ with an EV of À0.25 points both for self and for charity ( Figure 1B) .
Participants could evenly split earnings between self and charity by learning to select deck Sþ\Cþ or by alternating between decks S þþ\CÀ and SÀ\C þþ. Alternatively, they could maximize earnings for self by learning to select deck S þþ\Cþ (at the expense of earnings for charity) or could maximize the charity's earnings by learning to select deck SÀ\C þþ (at the expense of their own earnings). Importantly, three decks (Sþ\Cþ, S þþ\CÀ and SÀ\C þþ) were equal in EV (i.e. EV self þ EV charity ¼ 1, for these three decks), differing only on how those points were distributed between self and charity. Deck SÀ\CÀ had a negative EV both for self and for charity.
Analyses of behavior
We calculated an intended-donation score for each participant as the ratio between their declared intended donation and the total amount considered in the paper questionnaire ($50); this score was thereby normalized between the values of 0 and 1. In subsequent analyses in the results, we distinguished two groups of participants, an altruistic-group and a selfish-group, based on the distribution of their intended-donation scores. Note however that the label 'selfish-group' here is used in a relative sense, since even a small donation represents an altruistic act. We also calculated an actual-donation score for each participant as the ratio between the number of points earned during the task for the charity and the total number of points earned during the task [points charity /(points charity þ points self )]. Finally, we also calculated the altruism subscore of the HOQ for each participant following the scoring method indicated by Romer et al. (1986) . Using these values, we evaluated the participant-wise correlation between intended-donation, actualdonation and altruism scores.
We also evaluated whether participants in the altruistic-group and the selfish-group differed in the earnings that they collected during the experimental session. We included the participants' points self and points charity in an analysis of variance (ANOVA), along with the within-subjects factor recipient (self/charity) and the between-subject factor of group based on intended-split scores (altruistic-group/selfish-group). Tukey's honest significant difference (HSD) method was used in the calculation of post hoc contrasts throughout our behavioral and ERP data analyses.
Finally, we evaluated whether altruistic and selfish participants differ in the degree in which outcomes for self and charity impacted behavioral adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis. We considered each trial (t) in terms of the deck that was chosen on t. We then calculated the observed change in the probability for persevering in choosing a given deck across trials t þ 1, t þ 2 and t þ 3 as a function of whether the transitions between trials corresponded to gains or losses. We submitted this change in perseverance probability to an ANOVA with two within-subject factors [recipient (self/charity), valence (losses/gains)] and one between-subject factor of group based on intended-split scores (altruistic-group/selfish-group).
Electroencephalogram recording and preprocessing
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded continuously from 64 active-electrode channels mounted in a customized, extended coverage, elastic cap (Brain Products ActiCap) using a bandpass filter of 0.01-100 Hz at a sampling rate of 500 Hz (Brain Products ActiChamp). All channels were referenced to the right mastoid during recording. The positions of the 64 channels were equally spaced across the customized cap and covered the whole head from slightly above the eyebrows to below the inion (Woldorff et al., 2002) . Impedances of all channels were kept below 15 kX, and fixation was monitored with horizontal and vertical electrooculogram recordings. Recordings took place in trials, but the symbol label for each deck remaining constant from trial to trial. Feedback concerning outcomes for self and for the charity was sequentially presented as a number of colored stars and circles. The specific symbol-recipient association (stars-self/circles-charity vs stars-charity/circles-self) was randomized across participants (although consistent within a participant), and the specific sequence (self-first/charity-second vs charity-first/self-second) was randomized across trials for each participant. Red-colored shapes indicated the number of points lost and green-colored shapes indicated the number of points won. (B) There were four possible outcome valence combinations on each trial: Self-win\Charity-win, Self-win\Charity-loss, Self-loss\Charity-win and Self-loss\Charity-loss. The outcome on each trial was randomly determined according to the weight that the chosen deck assigned to each of these outcome valence combinations. For example, deck S þþ\C-was associated with a 30% chance of observing a self-win\charity-win outcome, 45% for self-win\charity-lose, 15% chance for self-lose\charity-win and 10% chances for selflose\charity-lose. Outcome magnitudes (1-4) were equiprobable (i.e. 25% each), resulting in specific EVs for self and charity associated with each deck.
an electrically shielded, sound-attenuated and dimly lit experimental chamber.
Offline, EEG data were exported to MATLAB (MathWorks) and processed using the EEGLAB software suite (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) and custom scripts. The data were low-pass filtered at 40 Hz using linear finite impulse response filtering, down-sampled to 250 Hz, and re-referenced to the algebraic average of the left and right mastoid electrodes. For each participant, we implemented a procedure for artifact removal based on an independent component analysis (ICA) approach that has been established previously (Debener et al., 2005; Eichele et al., 2005; Scheibe et al., 2010; San Mart ın et al., 2016) to obtain EEG data with greatly diminished contribution from ocular/biophysical artifacts. More specifically, we first visually rejected unsuitable portions of the continuous EEG data containing obvious non-neural noise artifacts (e.g. drifts, excessive blinks). Second, we separated the remaining data into 1200 ms feedback-locked epochs, spanning from 400 ms before to 800 ms after the onset of the feedback stimulus, using a prestimulus baseline period of 200 ms. Third, we performed a temporal infomax ICA (Bell and Sejnowski, 1995) . Fourth, independent components with scalp topographies and signals that could be assigned to known artifacts (e.g. blinks, heart beats) were removed from the data (Jung et al., 2000a,b; Delorme et al., 2007) . The remaining components were back-projected to scalp time-amplitude space to create an artifact-corrected EEG data set.
ERP data analysis
The ERP components analysed here include the FRN and three subcomponents of the P3 response: the P2 (early-P3a), P3a and P3b. The FRN has a frontocentral distribution with a typical peak of amplitude over the standard 10-20 FCz location at $250 ms after feedback onset (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; San Mart ın et al., 2010) . The P3 is usually formed by two subcomponents: the P3a with a frontocentral distribution and a maximum amplitude between 300 and 400 ms following stimulus presentation, and the P3b with a parietocentral distribution and a peak of amplitude occurring $100 ms later (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Polich, 2007; San Mart ın et al., 2013) . At frontal sites, there is an overlap between the FRN and the P3a, and studies have used the label 'P2' or 'P200' to refer to P3a activity that precedes the onset of the FRN (Rigoni et al., 2010; San Mart ın et al., 2010 . The superimposition of the FRN on the P3a also poses a challenge to the assessment of the FRN since, as several studies have noted, the FRN peak can be shifted depending on the amplitude of this frontal P3a (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Chase et al., 2011; Billeke et al., 2012; San Mart ın et al., 2013) .
To establish an unbiased, a priori method for identifying ERP components of interest, we adopted both the regions of interest and time windows from a previous study (San Mart ın et al., 2013) . In particular, we defined a frontocentral region of interest (ROI) of seven sensors centered on the standard FCz channel, and a parietocentral ROI of seven sensors centered on the standard Pz channel. We used the frontocentral ROI to calculate the P2, FRN and P3a. For each trial, the P2 was calculated as the average ERP voltage potential from a 152 to 184 ms postfeedback window. (Note that the effective sampling rate was 250 Hz, and thus these window lengths were all multiples of 4 ms.) To more effectively quantify the FRN amplitude accounting for differences in the P3-induced baseline, we used a mean amplitude to mean amplitude approach. More specifically, the FRN amplitude was calculated as the average potential across a 204-272 ms window after feedback, minus the average voltage potential from a short 188-200 ms anchoring window preceding it. This subtraction was performed in order to diminish the impact of differences in the P3-induced baseline on the FRN measurement. The P3a was quantified as the average potential from a 284 to 412 ms window, also in the frontal ROI. The P3b was defined by the average potential from a 416 to 796 ms window, now using the parietal ROI.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs analysed the ERP components with four within-subject factors: recipient (self/charity), valence (loss/win), magnitude (1-4), behavioral adjustment (switch/ stay), along with one between-subjects factor of group based on intended-split scores (altruistic-group/selfish-group). The inclusion of the factor behavioral adjustment was aimed at assessing the association between each ERP component and the behavioral adjustment on subsequent trials. In order to define levels of subsequent behavioral adjustment for the ERP data we considered each trial t in terms of the chosen deck, and we then asked whether the choice was the same or different on the next trial (t þ 1). If the choice on t þ 1 was the same than on trial t, we assigned the ERP data on trial t to a 'stay' bin. Otherwise, we assigned the ERP data on trial t to a 'switch' bin.
Results
Behavior
Before the task, participants were asked to declare what proportion of the money earned during the task they would be willing to donate to the charity. On average they declared themselves willing to donate 28.3% of that money (s.d. ¼ 22.0%). The mean intended-donation score was numerically larger for females (M ¼ 35%, s.d. ¼ 23.8%) than males (M ¼ 22.3%, s.d. ¼ 18.7%), but this trend did not reach statistical significance (t (36) ¼1.84, P ¼0.07).
The distribution of these intended-donation scores ( Figure 2 ) revealed two clearly distinguishable groups of participants: a group of participants with intended-donation scores lower than 30% (M ¼10.3%, s.d. ¼ 7.4%) and a second group with intendeddonation scores higher than 30% (M ¼ 50.6%, s.d. ¼ 9.7%). Hereafter, we refer to these as the selfish-group (n ¼ 21) and the altruistic-group (n ¼ 17), respectively.
Across participants, intended-donation scores covaried both with actual-donations resulting from the experimental task (r (36) ¼0.64, P < 0.001) and with the altruism subscores of the HOQ (r (36) ¼0.40, P ¼ 0.01), suggesting that participants' declared donation preferences greatly influenced the actual reward-earning results in the task and that these preferences were aligned with their self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors. Altruism HOQ subscores and actual-donations also tended to covary, but this correlation did not reach statistical significance (r (36) ¼0.29, P ¼ 0.08). There were no significant gender differences in the altruism subscores of the HOQ (t (36) ¼0.66, P ¼0.51) nor in actual-donations (t (36) ¼À0.19, P ¼0.85).
Next, we analysed the points that participants earned for each of the potential recipients (i.e. self and charity) using an ANOVA that included the between-subjects factor of group. This analysis revealed a main effect of recipient, showing that, in general, participants collected more points for self [M ¼ 384.4 Since decks Sþ\Cþ, S þþ\CÀ and SÀ\C þþ were associated with the same total number of awarded points (i.e. EV self þ EV charity ¼ 1, for these three decks), the main effect of group indicates that participants in the selfish-group were better than participants in the altruistic-group in avoiding the selection of deck SÀ\CÀ, which had a negative EV for both self and charity. In order to test the association between altruism and the probability of choosing SÀ\CÀ vs any of the other decks [i.e. p(SÀ\CÀ)], we fitted a logistic regression model according to the following equation:
. In this equation 'c intended_donations ' represents the intended-donation scores for each participant. This analysis confirmed that intended-donation scores were positively associated with choosing SÀ\CÀ (b 1 ¼ 0.8, P < 0.01). In other words, the more altruistic participants were (as reflected by their intended-donation scores), the worse they were at avoiding deck SÀ\CÀ.
We also evaluated the observed probability of persevering across trials as a function of gains or losses to each recipient. A visual inspection of Figure 3 suggests that participants in the Fig. 2 . Distribution of intended-donation scores. Participants were asked about the proportion of the money earned during the task they would be willing to donate to the charity. Based on the distribution of their responses we defined a selfish-group and an altruistic-group of participants. This group definition was used as a between-subjects factor in several of our subsequent behavioral and ERP data analyses. Fig. 3 . Behavioral adjustment related to gains and losses for self and for the charity. For participants in the selfish-group the probability of persevering on a particular choice across trials was affected by outcomes for self but not outcomes for the charity. For participants in the altruistic-group, outcomes for self and outcomes for the charity had similar effects on behavioral adjustment. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the means (SE).
selfish-group adjusted their behavior based on gains and losses to themselves, regardless of the consequences for charity. For participants in the altruistic-group, self-outcomes and charityoutcomes seem to have a much less differentiated impact on behavioral adjustments. A repeated-measures ANOVA on the observed probability of persevering in a particular choice across trials (from trial t to trial t þ 3) corroborated these observations, reflected by a significant interaction between group, recipient and valence [F(1, 36)¼18.9, P< 0.001]. Specifically, for participants in the selfish-group, self-losses were associated with a larger decrease in the probability of perseverating than selfgains (P < 0.01), but charity-losses and charity-gains did not have a significantly different impact on such probability (P ¼ 0.86). The ANOVA also showed a main effect of valence, because losses were associated with less perseveration than gains [F(1, 36)¼65.5, P < 0.001], regardless of group or recipient.
An alternative way of analysing this trial-by-trial behavioraladjustment dynamic would be to use a shorter time horizon, by considering each trial t in terms of the chosen deck (S) and then calculating the observed probability of choosing S on trial t þ 1 (i.e. one sequential trial only, rather than three) as a function of whether the transitions between trials corresponded to gains or losses, separately for self and for the charity. As expected, and as observed in our supplementary material (Supplementary Figure S1 ), this method confirmed that participants in the selfish-group adjusted their behavior on the next trial based solely on outcomes for self, whereas participants in the altruistic-group adjusted their behavior based both on outcomes for self and outcomes for the charity.
Differential ERP responses to outcomes for self and outcomes for charity
Our ERP analyses examined whether participants in the altruistic-group differed from participants in the selfish-group in their neural responses to monetary outcomes for themselves vs for charity. We measured four ERP components (P2, FRN, P3a and P3b, Figure 4 for time windows and ROIs) and submitted each http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/ component to a repeated-measures ANOVA with four withinsubject factors: valence (loss/win), magnitude (1-4), behavioral adjustment (switch/stay) and recipient (self/charity); and with group as a between-subjects factor (altruistic-group/selfishgroup). Below we report the results of this analysis for each of these ERP components.
Effects on the P2 component (latency 152-184 ms). The ANOVA in our P2 measure did not find a significant effect of valence, magnitude or behavioral adjustment (P's> 0.05). It did find a main effect of outcome recipient [F(1, 36)¼13.2, P< 0.001], indicating that outcomes for self-elicited a larger P2 response than outcomes for charity. Interestingly, although group did not have a main effect on the P2, the effect of recipient interacted with group [F(1, 36)¼5.6, P< 0.05]. Subsequent post hoc contrasts revealed that this interaction derived from the P2 amplitude being greater in response to outcomes for self than for charity in participants within the selfish-group (P < 0.01), but with no significant self-vs-charity P2 difference in participants within the altruistic-group (P ¼ 0.83) ( Figure 5 ).
Given that within each trial the outcome for self could appear either before or after the outcome for charity, we examined whether the differences between groups on the neural responses to those outcomes might be explained by their relative sequence. Accordingly, we ran a complementary ANOVA on the outcome processing with recipient (self/charity) and sequence (presented first/presented second) as within-subject factors, and group as a between-subjects factor (altruistic-group/selfishgroup). We found that both the main effect of recipient [F(1, 36)¼15.6, P < 0.001] and the interaction between recipient and group [F(1, 36)¼7.3, P < 0.05] continued to hold after controlling for the relative timing of outcomes for self and outcomes for charity within each trial. We also found a main effect of sequence [F(1, 36)¼15.0, P < 0.001]. More specifically, the P2 was larger for the second outcome in the sequence than for the first one. However, we did not further analyse this effect because it was not related to our main experimental questions and it did not interact with factors recipient or group.
Effects on the FRN component (latency 204-272 ms). As expected, the FRN was modulated by outcome valence, being larger (i.e. more negative) after losses compared with gains [F(1, 36)¼23.9, P < 0.001]. We also found a main effect of outcome magnitude [F(1, 108)¼35.3, P< 0.001]. As confirmed by post hoc pairwise comparisons (1 > 2, 2 > 3, 3 > 4; P's < 0.05), the smaller the outcome magnitude, the larger the FRN (see left panel in Figure 4A ). The ANOVA also revealed an interaction between outcome magnitude and outcome valence [F(1, 108)¼5.7, P < 0.05]. In order to explore this interaction, we calculated the loss-minus-win FRNdifference for each magnitude (1 to 4, see left panel in Figure 4B ) on each participant, and submitted these measures to a oneway ANOVA, which revealed significant differences between these [F(3, 111)¼5.7, P< 0.05]. Post hoc pairwise contrasts revealed that outcome magnitudes 4 and 3 were associated with larger loss-minus-win FRN-differences than outcome magnitudes 1 and 2 (4 > 1, 4 > 2, 3 > 1, 3 > 2; P's < 0.01). No significant differences were found between outcome magnitudes 3 and 4 (P ¼ 0.66), or between outcome magnitudes 1 and 2 (P ¼ 0.98).
We did not find any significant effect of recipient, group or behavioral adjustment. However, we did find an interaction between outcome valence and recipient [F(1, 36)¼7.0, P < 0.05]. We performed a post hoc analysis to explore this interaction. Specifically, we calculated, for each participant, the loss-minuswin FRN-difference separately for outcomes for self and outcomes for charity. The loss-minus-win FRN difference was significantly larger for self than for charity [t(74) ¼ À2.52, P < 0.05] (see lower panels in Figure 5) . Importantly, the original ANOVA did not find a three-way interaction between valence, recipient and group (P ¼ 0.2), which indicates that the loss-minus-win FRNdifference was greater for self than for charity, regardless of whether participants were relatively more selfish or altruistic, and this FRN effect did not differ between the two groups.
Effects on the P3a component (latency 284-412 ms). The ANOVA performed on our frontally distributed P3a measure did not find a significant effect of valence or magnitude. However, the analysis revealed a main effect of behavioral adjustment [F(1, 36)¼22.2, P< 0.001]. The P3a was significantly larger for outcomes that were followed by a different choice (i.e. switch trials) than for outcomes that were followed by the same choice (i.e. stay trials) (Supplementary Figure S2) . This result is consistent with recent studies indicating that the P3 reflects processes that predict a future adjustment in choice behavior (Chase et al., 2011; San Mart ın et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013) .
The ANOVA performed on the P3a also revealed a main effect of recipient [F(1, 36)¼57.4, P< 0.001], indicating that outcomes for self-elicited a larger P3a response than did outcomes for charity. The between-subjects factor of group was not associated to a significant main effect. However, similar to the results for the P2 and unlike the FRN, the effect of recipient interacted significantly with group [F(1, 36)¼13.8, P< 0.001; Figure 5 ]. Post hoc contrasts revealed more specifically that the P3a amplitude was greater in response to outcomes for self than for charity in participants within the selfish-group (P < 0.01). In the altruistic group this trend approached significance (P ¼ 0.06). Interestingly, the interaction between recipient and group was specifically explained by an increase of the P3a for self in the selfish-group compared with the P3a for self in the altruisticgroup (P < 0.05), because there was no significant differences between these groups in their P3a responses to the outcomes for charity (P ¼ 0.96) ( Figure 5 ). Both the main effect of recipient [F(1, 36)¼57.4, P< 0.001] and the interaction between recipient and group [F(1, 36)¼14.6, P < 0.001] held after controlling for the relative within-trial presentation timing (first vs second) of the outcome for self vs for charity.
Effects on the P3b component (latency 416-796 ms). The ANOVA on the parietally distributed P3b revealed main effects of both outcome valence [F(1, 36)¼6.4, P ¼ 0.0126] and outcome magnitude [F(3, 108) ¼109.61, P< 0.001], indicating that the P3b was both greater for losses than gains and greater for large magnitude outcomes compared with small magnitude ones (4 > 3, 4 > 2, 4 > 1, 3 > 2, 3 > 1, P's < 0.001; but 2 > 1, P ¼ 0.41. See right panel in Figure 4B ). We also found a main effect of behavioral adjustment [F(1, 36)¼13.6, P< 0.001], indicating that the P3b was larger for switch trials than stay trials.
Similar to the results for the P2 and the P3a, we found a main effect of recipient on the P3b [F(1, 36)¼70.4, P< 0.001], with larger responses being elicited by outcomes for self than by outcomes for charity (Supplementary Figure S3) . Also similar to the results for the P2 and the P3a, group did not have a significant effect on the P3b (P > 0.05) and recipient interacted with group [F(1, 36)¼16.2, P< 0.001]. However, and unlike the case of the P2 and P3a, the P3b was significantly larger for self than for charity's outcomes both in the selfish-group (P < 0.01) and the altruistic-group (P < 0.05). Specifically, while there were no significant differences between these groups with regard to their P3b responses to the outcomes for self (P ¼ 0.09), the P3b in response to the outcomes for charity was significantly smaller in the selfish-group than in the altruistic-group (P < 0.01). The main effect of recipient [F(1, 36)¼68.5, P< 0.001], and the interaction between recipient and group [F(1, 36)¼16.7, P< 0.001], held after controlling for the relative timing within trials of the outcome for self and for charity.
For the P3b (and not for the P2 and P3a) we also found a three-way interaction between recipient, behavioral adjustment and group [F(1, 36)¼4.8, P < 0.05]. Subsequent post hoc comparisons showed more specifically that only the P3b to outcomes for self in participants in the selfish-group significantly predicted behavioral adjustment (switch > stay after outcomes for self in the selfish-group P's < 0.01; P > 0.4 for the rest of the post hoc contrasts) (Supplementary Figure S2) .
Finally, considering that P2, P3a and P3b correspond to different subcomponents of the P3 response, we conducted a supplementary repeated measures ANOVA with P3-subcomponent as a factor to evaluate whether the differences between these subcomponents would still hold when all were included in the same model. The results of that analysis matched the results that we obtained using a separate ANOVA for each subcomponent (Supplementary Table S1 ).
ERP responses to monetary feedback predict differences in self-reported helping behavior
The previous ERP analyses showed that the early stages of the P3 response, namely the P2 and P3a, distinguished between participants in the selfish-group and participants in the altruistic-group in that only selfish participants presented a significant self-vscharity difference in these early subcomponents. This was not the case for the P3b, because even though the self-vs-charity P3b difference was smaller in the altruistic-group than in the selfishgroup, even participants in the altruistic-group presented a significantly increased P3b response for self vs charity.
For these reasons, we specifically wanted to evaluate whether the P2 and P3a responses also predicted individual differences in actual donations (resulting from participants' performance) and self-reports of engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors. For each participant, we extracted the difference between the mean amplitude of the P2 and P3a responses to outcomes for charity vs for outcomes to self (i.e. self-minus-charity ERP amplitude differences) and evaluated the participant-wise correlation between these ERP contrasts and both actual-donations and the altruism subscore of the HOQ. Across participants, the correlations between the P2 amplitude and the altruism subscore (r (36) ¼À0.32, P ¼ 0.05) and actual-donations (r (36) ¼ À0.30, P ¼ 0.07) approached significance. The P3a contrast significantly covaried with both the altruism subscore (r (36) ¼ À0.42, P ¼ 0.004) and the actual-donations (r (36) ¼ À0.43, P ¼ 0.003) (Figure 6 ). In summary, the greater the self-minus-charity-P3a amplitude across participants, the smaller the actual-donations resulting from the task and the lower the self-reported probability of engaging real-life altruism behaviors, with the same general tendencies being observed for the earlier P2. In contrast, performing the same analysis with the FRN feedback valence effect (loss minus win for self vs loss minus win for charity) did not show a significant association with either altruism or actual-donations (P's > 0.22). We summarize this and our other key results in Table 1 .
Discussion
In social environments, decisions determine rewards not only for oneself but also for others. Recent behavioral findings have indicated that individual differences in the ability to learn from outcomes for others (i.e. social learning) can explain part of the variation in altruism observed among people (Kwak et al., 2014) . The present work indicates specific neurocognitive mechanisms-as indexed by ERP components-that may underlie the link between altruism and social learning. We showed that the amplitude of the P3 and its subcomponents, which have been associated with attention-related processes related to learning and environmental model updating, predicted individual differences both in social learning and in self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors. Specifically, the less altruistic the participants, the greater the difference in the P3 response to outcomes for self vs outcomes for the charity. In contrast, no relationships between altruistic tendencies and the FRN component were observed.
Our findings suggest that individual differences in pro-social behavior are not associated with differences in the way that the brain extracts utility from outcomes for oneself vs for others (as reflected by the FRN), but with differences in the amount of attention that is allocated to learn from outcomes for oneself vs outcomes for others (P3). Moreover, the fact that altruismrelated differences in the P3 response are observable as early as the P2 time window ($170 ms) suggest that the differences in altruistic tendencies are associated with early processes of attentional capture. Overall, the present electrophysiological results provide insights into how individual differences in pro-social behavior are associated with differences in the way that the brain allocates attentional resources for the processing of outcomes for oneself vs for others.
Altruism is associated with differential reward learning for self and others
Previous behavioral studies have shown that there are significant individual differences in the expression of pro-social behaviors (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003; Murphy et al., 2011) and in the neurocognitive mechanisms that have been linked to that heterogeneity (Tankersley et al., 2007; Donaldson and Young, 2008; Morishima et al., 2012) . In a recent behavioral study, Kwak et al. (2014) showed that this heterogeneity is also associated with individual differences in the learning of pro-social reward contingencies. They found that altruistic individuals, compared with more selfish ones, were better at learning to increase monetary gains for a charity. Our behavioral results replicate and extend this finding by showing that the intended-donations declared by participants before a reward-learning task covaried both with their actual-donations resulting from performance in the task and with their self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behavior as measured by the HOQ. Moreover, our behavioral results also show that participants with more selfish goals adjusted their decision behavior based on gains and losses for themselves, with little regard to the consequences for charity. In contrast, participants with more altruistic goals adjusted their behavior based on the consequences for both themselves and for charity. Overall, our behavioral results suggest that participants' goals were aligned with their daily life altruistic tendencies, and that those goals strongly influenced their final results in the task. Unexpectedly, participants with more altruistic goals were also worse at avoiding the deck that had a negative EV for both self and charity (SÀ\CÀ). One potential explanation for this result is that attempting to learn about both self and charity outcomes-as was clearly intended by these participants-increases the overall difficulty of the task compared with tracking only one's own outcomes. Critically, this hypothesis predicts that participants who are altruistic to the point of disregarding outcomes for self should be just as good at avoiding the SÀ\CÀ choice as selfish participants who disregard outcomes for the charity. Unfortunately, we could not test this possibility here because few participants' behavior approached that extreme sort of altruism (Figure 2 ).
The FRN distinguishes other-regarding outcomes but not altruistic tendencies Previous studies have shown that different social contexts can modulate subjects' empathic responses toward others and that the FRN ERP component covaries with such empathic responses (Yu and Zhou, 2006; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009) . From this, we expected to find FRN responses (reflecting losses minus wins) both to outcomes for oneself and to outcomes for charity. We also may have expected that the difference between the magnitudes of these effects (FRN to outcomes for self minus FRN to outcomes for the charity) would covary with participants' self-reported altruistic tendencies, with this difference being smaller for those with higher selfreported levels of such tendencies. The results showed a difference between the loss-minus-win FRN responses for self vs charity outcomes, although the relative sizes of these effects were unaffected by altruism. Below, we discuss the implications of these results.
Crucially, losses (vs wins) for the charity elicited an FRN in both groups of participants, indicating that neural calculations of monetary outcomes affecting societal causes share processing similarities to outcomes during interpersonal interactions (Yu and Zhou, 2006; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Leng and Zhou, 2010; Ma et al., 2011) . Given that previous neuroimaging studies have found that transfers to charity elicit neural activity in subcortical areas that typically respond to primary rewards for the individual (Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2010) , our results also provide indirect support to the theory that the FRN reflects cortical activity that is being modulated by utility computations performed by subcortical reward areas. This suggestion should be taken with caution, however, because these subcortical circuits, in contrast to cortical regions, do not have the appropriate geometry to be able produce ERPs at the scalp (Luck, 2005) , and thus the ERP recordings do not directly reflect activity in subcortical circuits. On the other hand, due to the high temporal resolution of the ERPs employed here, the current results extend previous neuroimaging findings by indicating that the human brain calculates the value from contributing to both self-related and societal causes at a relatively early stage of processingnamely, within $250 ms of the presentation of that outcome.
It is also the case that the FRN feedback valence effects were larger for self vs charity, for both the selfish and altruistic groups. Moreover, these self-vs-charity-ERP effects did not differ between the two groups and did not predict individual differences in selfreported altruism, intended donations, nor actual donations derived from the task. This suggests that individual differences in pro-social behavior are not associated with differences in the way that the brain extracts utility from outcomes for oneself vs for others. This negative result may seem surprising given that a previous study found that an antagonist's gain vs loss elicited a negative-going FRN, as if receiving such information was being interpreted as a loss of some sort to oneself (Itagaki and Katayama, 2008) . From this we may have expected to see a tendency toward a reversed polarity FRN in response to charity's outcomes, especially in our group of selfish participants. However, the FRN feedback valence effect was greater for self than charity, and similarly so regardless of participants' altruism.
Our results thus suggest that the FRN reflects an initial and relatively coarse evaluation of the acquired/lost value that may distinguish between 'self' and 'others', but which does not covary with participants' altruistic tendencies. This interpretation may seem to conflict with findings indicating that the FRN toward others' outcomes is modulated by empathy (Yu and Zhou, 2006; Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009) . However, previous studies have also suggested that brain responses underlying altruistic tendencies could actually be independent from brain responses underlying empathy (Tankersley et al., 2007) . Although we did not include any psychometric empathy scales in our study, our results are consistent with this latter suggestion.
The P3 predicts individual differences in altruism
In contrast to the FRN, we found large differential amplitudes of the P3 responses for self vs charity that covaried robustly with individual differences in intended donations, actual donations and self-reported engagement in real life altruistic behaviors. Importantly all the P3 subcomponents (i.e. P2, P3a, P3b) were larger in response to outcomes for self than to outcomes for the charity in both the selfish and altruistic groups. However, and specially with regard to the early stages of the P3 response (i.e. P2, P3a), that difference was even greater for the selfish individuals than for the more altruistic ones. This finding indicates that participants in the selfish and altruistic groups differ in the allocation of attentional resources to outcomes for oneself vs outcomes for others.
The fact that altruism-related differences in attention allocation are observable as early as the P2 deflection ($170 ms) suggest that the differences in altruistic tendencies are associated with an attentional process that precedes the evaluation of feedback valence ($240 ms for the FRN). The P2 has been shown to be specifically associated with higher arousal levels (Carretié et al., 2001; Schutter et al., 2004) and attention capturing by target stimuli (Potts et al., 1996 (Potts et al., , 2006 Potts, 2004) . This raises the possibility that low levels of altruism may be associated with the presence of a feature-specific bottom-up saliency map like those that appear to underlie some attentional capture effects during visual search (Eimer et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012) . Salience coding could selectively enhance the signal-to noise ratio of preferred outcomes (e.g. those generating advantages rewards for oneself). Testing such a conjecture could be an important direction for future work.
In addition, the P3b in the selfish group was larger in response to outcomes for self that preceded changes in choice behavior than for outcomes that were followed by staying with the same choice in the next trial. This result suggests that participants in the selfish groups attend only the outcomes for oneself during the cognitive updating of represented cue-reward contingencies. Strengthening this interpretation, this ERP result presents a striking parallel with our behavioral results showing that 'selfish' participants adjusted their behavior according to outcomes for self with no regard to the outcomes for charity.
Taken together, our P3 results are broadly consistent with the view of the P3 as an ERP component reflecting the amount of cognitive resources used during the revision of an internal model of the environment that is used to achieve subjective goals (Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988) . This 'contextupdating theory' hypothesis for the P3 predicts that the amplitude of such ERP activity will scale with the probability of adjusting choices on subsequent trials, a result that has been reported by previous studies (Chase et al., 2011; San Mart ın et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013) and was also observed here. It indeed seems likely that the participants in our study dynamically updated an internal model of the association between the deck symbols and the probability of winning for self and for the charity. Under this view, decreasing levels of altruism across participants would be associated with an increasing amount of attention devoted to outcomes for themselves and learning from those outcomes, as compared with attention toward outcomes for the charity. This would then be reflected in a negative correlation between the self-minus-charity P3 contrast and the donations to the charity resulting from participants' choices during the task, as was the case. This interpretation is also consistent with results from the previous behavioral study by Kwak et al. (2014) , who found that a relatively higher weighting of charitable as opposed to personal outcomes, as reflected in the reinforcement learning model parameter, predicted altruistic behavior.
In our study, intended donations, actual performance-based donation, self-reported altruism and differential P3 responses for self vs charity appear to be intimately related to each other. Although we cannot trace the full set of links among these variables, we can propose two causal interpretations that could be tested in future studies: First, daily life altruistic tendencies, as measured by self-reports, may have led to setting a subjective goal in our task, as measured by intended donations, which may in turn have determined the relative amounts of attention paid to outcome for self and outcome for charity, which would then be reflected in the differential self vs charity P3. Consistent with this interpretation, Moll et al. (2006) found that altruism was associated with the activation of anterior regions of the medial prefrontal cortex that have also been implicated in goal representation (Wood and Grafman, 2003; Kringelbach and Radcliffe, 2005) .
A second explanation would attribute a causal role to attention-related learning biases by saying that innate or acquired individual differences in the ability to learn about outcomes for others, as measured by the differential self vs charity P3, would act as a cognitive precursor for real-life altruistic tendencies. These tendencies may, in turn, determine the relative amounts of attention devoted to learn how to increase the benefits for charity vs self. In this sense, the ability to learn about rewards for others could be part of the neural substrate of altruism. Indirect support for this interpretation comes from the fact that a likely contributing neural source of the P3 is the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) (Kiss et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1990; Halgren et al., 1995) , a region which acts as a hub of streams that support cognitive processes such as attention, memory and social processing (Carter and Huettel, 2013) . Indeed, TPJ activity has been shown to be involved in shifting attention to focus on another's perspective (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Young and Saxe, 2009 ). In addition, activity in this region correlates with subjects' self-reported altruism (Tankersley et al., 2007) and willingness-to-give as measured by average donations (Hare et al., 2010) . Moreover, individual differences in gray matter volume in the TPJ have been shown to scale with individuals' altruism (Morishima et al., 2012) .
Importantly, the two above proposed interpretations are not necessarily incompatible with each other. It could indeed be the case that innate or acquired biases in learning about rewards for others constitute a precursor for altruism, which would lead to altruistic goals that shape learning about benefits for others. Tracing the interaction and causal relationships between these factors will be an important pursuit for future studies aimed at deciphering the nature and neural underpinnings of human altruism.
